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Summary
Public interest in approaches that might provide prescription drugs at lower cost,
particularly for the elderly, has rekindled discussion over the role the federal
government plays in facilitating the creation of new pharmaceuticals for the
marketplace. In the current debate, some argue that the government’s financial,
scientific, and/or clinical support of health-related research and development (R&D)
entitles the public to commensurate considerations in the prices charged for any
resulting drugs. Others view government intervention in price decisions based upon
initial federal funding as contrary to a long-term trend of government promotion of
innovation, technological advancement, and the commercialization of technology by
the business community leading to new products and processes for the marketplace.
The government traditionally funds R&D to meet the mission requirements of
the federal departments and agencies. It also supports work in areas where there is
an identified need for research, primarily basic research, not being performed in the
private sector. Over the past 25 years, congressional initiatives have expanded the
government’s role to include the promotion of technological innovation to meet other
national needs, particularly the economic growth that flows from the use of new and
improved goods and services. Various laws facilitate commercialization of federallyfunded R&D through technology transfer, cooperative R&D, and intellectual property
rights. The legislated incentives are intended to encourage additional private sector
investments often necessary to further develop marketable products. The current
approach to technology development attempts to balance the public sector’s interest
in new and improved technologies with concerns over providing companies valuable
benefits without adequate accountability or compensation.
Some question whether or not the current balance is appropriate, particularly
with respect to drug discovery. The particular nature and expense of health-related
R&D has focused attention on the manner in which the National Institutes of Health
(NIH) undertakes research activities. Critics maintain that the need for technology
development incentives in the pharmaceutical and/or biotechnology sectors is
mitigated by industry access to government-supported work at no cost, monopoly
power through patent protection, and additional regulatory and tax advantages such
as those conveyed through the Hatch-Waxman Act and the Orphan Drug Act.
Supporters of the existing approach argue that these incentives are precisely what are
required and have given rise to robust pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries.
It remains to be seen whether or not decisions related to federal involvement in issues
related to pharmaceutical R&D will change the nature of the current approach to
government-industry-university cooperation. This report will be updated as events
warrant.
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Federal R&D, Drug Discovery, and Pricing:
Insights from the NIH-University-Industry
Relationship
Overview
Public interest in approaches that might provide prescription drugs at lower cost,
particularly for the elderly, has rekindled discussion over the role the federal
government plays in facilitating the development and marketing of new
pharmaceuticals. In the current debate, some argue that the government’s financial,
research, and/or clinical support of health-related R&D entitles the public to
commensurate considerations in the prices charged for any resulting drugs. Others
view government intervention in price decisions based upon initial federal funding
of basic research as contrary to a long-term trend of government promotion of
innovation, technological advancement, and the commercialization of technology by
the business community leading to new products and processes for the marketplace.
The federal involvement in R&D stems, in part, from the understanding that
technological advancement is a key element in economic growth. Many of the
innovations that stimulate technological progress are rooted in basic research.
However, because the returns to basic research accrue to society as a whole and often
can not be captured by the firm performing the work, there tends to be
underinvestment in these activities. Thus, the government typically funds
fundamental research as a “public good.” Concurrently, the government has an
interest in ensuring that the results of this enterprise are applied to generate new
goods and services to meet the demands of citizens. The benefits of research emerge
when innovations are available in the marketplace. In recognition of this, the
Congress has passed legislation to facilitate the commercialization of new
technology.
Government policies implemented over the past 25 years include incentives to
increase private sector investment in technology development through technology
transfer, cooperative R&D, and intellectual property rights. The intent is to
encourage academia and industry to commit the necessary, and often substantial,
resources required to take the results of federally-supported R&D and generate
products or processes to meet market demand. Utilizing patent ownership and
facilitating collaborative government-university-industry efforts, the current
legislative approach attempts to balance the public’s need for new technologies and
techniques with concerns over providing companies valuable benefits without
adequate accountability or compensation. The reservation of certain rights for the
government that permit federal intervention in specific circumstances associated with
health and safety concerns are intended to act as safeguards for the public.
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Some Members of Congress have questioned the adequacy of the current
balance between public and private needs. The particular nature of health-related
research and development, and the substantial federal investment in this area (NIH
will have funded approximately $27 billion for medical research in FY20061), has led
critics of the current system to argue that the necessity of incentives is mitigated by
such factors as free access to the results of federally funded work, by the monopoly
power permitted by patent protection, and by other regulatory and tax advantages
such as those conveyed by the Hatch-Waxman Act or the Orphan Drug Act.
Therefore, some maintain, a more direct payback should be required including
recoupment of public sector financial support or government involvement in price
decisions. Others counter that these inducements have played an important role in
making the U.S. pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries innovative, productive,
and competitive. They point out that while the government contributed to
development of the Internet, as well as to the telecommunications, semiconductor,
and aviation industries, no one is advocating federal involvement in cost
considerations in these areas as they are in the health field.
This paper explores the reasons behind government funding of research and
development and subsequent efforts to facilitate private sector commercialization of
the results of such work. It does not address issues associated with drug costs or
pricing. Instead, the report looks at the manner in which the National Institutes of
Health (NIH) supports research to encourage the development of new
pharmaceuticals and therapeutics, particularly through cooperative activities among
academia, industry, and government. The goal is to offer insights concerning the
discussion on whether or not use of the results of the federal R&D enterprise
warrants government input into price decisions made by the private sector. Concerns
surrounding innovation in health-related areas will be explored within the broader
context of the government’s role in facilitating technological progress.

Government Support for R&D
The U.S. government is expected to spend $133.7 billion for research and
development in FY2006 (according to the National Science Foundation).
Traditionally, the government funds R&D to meet the mission requirements of the
federal departments and agencies (e.g., defense, public health, environmental
quality). It also supports work in areas where there is an identified need for research,
primarily basic research, not being performed in the private sector. Federal funding
reflects a consensus that while basic research is the foundation for many innovations,
the rate of return to society as a whole generated by investments in this activity is
significantly larger than the benefits that can be captured by any one firm performing
it.2 “Government support of basic scientific research represents an example of the
1
2

Information from [http://www.nih.gov/about/budget.htm].

Edwin Mansfield, “Social Returns From R&D: Findings, Methods, and Limitations,”
Research/Technology Management, November-December 1991, 24. See also: Charles I.
Jones and John C. Williams, “Measuring the Social Return to R&D,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, November 1998, 1119 and Richard R. Nelson and Paul M. Romer, “Science,
(continued...)
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government furnishing a good, scientific knowledge, that improves social wellbeing...a good that cannot be sold because those who do not pay receive the benefits
anyway.”3 Estimates of a social rate of return on R&D spending over twice that of
the rate of return to the inventor of the product often leads to underinvestment by the
business community.4 In addition, incentives for private sector financial
commitments are dampened by the fact that spending for R&D runs a high risk of
failure. The rewards of basic research tend to be long-term, sometimes not
marketable, and not always evident.
Congressional initiatives have expanded the government’s role in R&D to
include the promotion of technological innovation to meet other national needs,
particularly the economic growth that flows from the commercialization and use of
new products and production processes by the private sector.5 Technological
advancement is an important factor in the Nation’s economic growth. Experts widely
accept that technical progress is responsible for up to one-half the growth of the U.S.
economy and is one principal driving force for increases in our standard of living.6
Historically, industrial expansion was based on the use of technology to exploit
natural resources. Today, such growth tends to be founded on scientific discoveries
and engineering knowledge (e.g., biomedical applications, electronics) and is even
more dependent than before on the development and use of technology. Technology
can help drive the economy because it contributes to the creation of new goods and
services, new industries, new jobs, and new capital. It can expand the range of
services offered and extend the geographic distribution of those services. The
application of technologies also can contribute to the resolution of those national
problems that are amenable to technological solutions.
Technological progress is achieved through innovation, the process by which
industry provides new and improved products, manufacturing processes, and
services. Research and development are important to this technological advancement
in many ways. R&D contributes to economic growth by its impact on productivity.
For more than two decades various experts studying the effects of research and
2

(...continued)
Economic Growth, and Public Policy,” in Bruce R. Smith and Claude E. Barfield, eds.
Technology, R&D, and the Economy, (Washington, The Brookings Institution and the
American Enterprise Institute, Washington, 1996), 57.

3

Baruch Brody, “Public Goods and Fair Prices,” Hastings Center Report, March-April
1996, 8.

4

For a list of relevant research in this area see Council of Economic Advisors. Supporting
Research and Development to Promote Economic Growth: The Federal Government’s Role,
(October 1995), 6-7.

5

For information on relevant legislation see CRS Report RL33528, Industrial
Competitiveness and Technological Advancement: Debate Over Government Policy, by
Wendy H. Schacht.
6

Gregory Tassey, The Economics of R&D Policy (Connecticut: Quorum Books, 1997), 54.
See also: Edwin Mansfield, “Intellectual Property Rights, Technological Change, and
Economic Growth,” in: Intellectual Property Rights and Capital Formation in the Next
Decade, eds. Charls E. Walker and Mark A. Bloomfield (New York: University Press of
America, 1988), 5.
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development have found that productivity growth in an industry or a firm is generally
directly and significantly related to the amount spent previously on R&D in that
industry or company.7 Analysts estimate that one-half of productivity increases
(output per person) are the result of investments in research and development.8
Others argue that innovations arising from R&D are the most important ones.9
Profound changes in our society have been brought about by advances in research,
resulting in new products and processes in the areas of medicine, semiconductors,
computers, and materials, just to name a few.
To leverage the substantial federal investment in R&D, government policies and
practices provide incentives for private sector utilization of the results of this
endeavor to make products and processes for the marketplace. Legislative initiatives
(discussed below) facilitate the commercialization of government-funded research
and development through mechanisms that encourage government-industryuniversity collaboration. Joint federal efforts with the private sector offer a means to
get government-generated research and technical know-how to the business
community where it can be developed, commercialized and made available for use
to meet the needs of government agencies or to stimulate economic growth vital to
the nation’s welfare and security. In addition, cooperative ventures among
government institutions, companies, and academia allow for R&D to cross traditional
boundaries of knowledge and experience. Ideas, expertise, and know-how are
combined, facilitating a mix that may lead to more creativity and invention.

Industrial R&D
Industry also has an interest in cooperative efforts with government and/or
academia. As new technologies are generated and their impact more widespread,
industry has had to commit an increasing amount of resources to the performance of
R&D. Concurrently, shortened product cycles have led to expanded demands for
new technology and higher costs for technology development as reflected in the 37%
increase in company support for such work between 1997 and 2003 (using current
dollars).10 The rising expense of research and development has been juxtaposed with

7

Alden S. Bean, “Why Some R&D Organizations Are More Productive Than Others,”
Research/Technology Management, Jan.-Feb. 1995, 26. See also: Edwin Mansfield, “How
Economists See R&D,” Harvard Business Review, Nov.-Dec. 1981, 98.
8

Zvi Griliches, “The Search for R&D Spillovers,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics,
1992, 29-47. Cited in: Council of Economic Advisors, Supporting Research and
Development to Promote Economic Growth: The Federal Government’s Role, October,
1995, 1.
9

Ralph Landau, “Technology, Economics, and Public Policy,” in: Technology and
Economic Policy, eds. Ralph Landau and Dale W. Jorgenson (Cambridge: Ballinger
Publishing Co. 1986), 5.
10

National Science Foundation, Research and Development in Industry: 2002, Table 1,
available at [http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsf06322/pdf/tab1.pdf] and National Science
Foundation, InfoBrief: Increase in U.S. Industrial R&D Expenditures Reported for 2003
(continued...)
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increasing international competition and shareholder demands for short-term returns.
Thus, partnerships are a result of “today’s complex technologies, intense competition,
and information overload [that] have required new approaches” beyond the funding
of scientists to pursue their own interests.11 Cooperative R&D permits work to be
done which is too expensive for one company to fund or of marginal value for any
given firm.
Companies have developed alternative means of acquiring new technologies
while controlling the requisite costs. External alliances allow access to innovations
without the expense and risks of generating them independently. Thus, collaboration
permits firms to acquire the basic research they need from outside organizations.
Experts argue that, for certain industries, the more extensive a firm’s emphasis on
external sources of technical knowledge, the greater its total factor productivity
growth.12 A survey undertaken by PriceWaterhouseCoopers found “businesses that
outsource are growing faster, larger, and more profitable than those that do not.”13
The perceived benefits to this approach are reflected in increasing company support
for external R&D. In 2003, companies funded $10.2 billion in outside research and
development, 5% of the total firm financed R&D, up from 2.5% in 1997.14 In the
early 1980s, just after the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, less than 2% of industry
funding was directed at extramural research.15
It should be noted that joint ventures are not always successful due, in part, to
failed concepts, cultural differences between companies or organizations, managerial
and financial issues, or conflicting goals and objectives. However, studies by
PriceWaterhouseCoopers identify numerous benefits that have resulted from
partnering including increased sales of existing products; improved competitive
position; increased productivity; development of more new products or business
lines; and better operations or technology. Of the fastest growing U.S. firms, 56%
have partnered in the past three years “resulting in more innovative products, more
profit opportunities - and significantly higher growth rates.”16 In an earlier survey
undertaken by the company they concluded that “collaborative growth firms are
spending more on new product development while focusing more on bigger winners

10

(...continued)
Makes Up for Earlier Decline, December 2005 available at [http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs].
11

John Carey, “What Price Science?” Business Week, 26 May, 1997, 168.

12

Alden S. Bean, “Why Some R&D Organizations Are More Productive Than Others,”
Research/Technology Management, January-February 1995, 26.

13

PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Trendsetter Newsletter, March 13, 2000, available at
[http://www.barometersurveys.com].
14

InfoBrief: Increase in U.S. Industrial R&D Expenditures Reported for 2003 Makes Up
for Earlier Decline, 3.
15

John E. Jankowski, “R&D: Foundation for Innovation,” Research/Technology
Management, March-April 1998, 17.
16

PriceWaterhouseCoopers, “Partnerships Have Big Payoffs for Fast-Growth Companies,”
Trendsetter Barometer, August 26, 2002 available at [http://www.barometersurveys.com].
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and on innovation...[and]...are not reluctant to go outside their organization to work
with others in the development of their innovative new products.”17
This trend is reflected in the pharmaceutical industry. There are an increasing
number of alliances, particularly between large businesses and small biotech
companies: “For example, the 20 largest pharmaceutical firms signed an average of
1.4 alliances per year with a biotech company during 1988-1990, but 5.7 such
alliances per year in 1997-1998.”18 Studies show that large firms have a higher rate
of success in developing compounds they obtain through licensing than in
compounds they generate in house.19 It appears that “merging technological
knowledge and skills from different companies improves the innovation process.”20
In addition to joint projects among companies, industry-university cooperation
in R&D provides another important means to facilitate technological innovation.
Traditionally, much of the basic research integral to certain technological
advancement is funded by the government but performed in academia. Companies
are increasingly looking toward this community to provide the underlying knowledge
necessary for the development of commercial products without financing the large
overhead costs associated with in-house research. A study by the late Edwin
Mansfield (University of Pennsylvania Wharton School of Business) demonstrated
that “over 10% of the new products and processes introduced in [the 8 industries
explored] could not have been developed (without substantial delay) in the absence
of recent academic research.”21 According to David Blumenthal at the Harvard
School of Medicine, by the mid to late 1990s, over 90% of life science companies in
the United States had a cooperative relationship with universities.22

Patents
Much of this cooperative work, whether government-industry, governmentuniversity, industry-university, or industry-industry, is facilitated by the patent
system. Patents protect the inventor’s investments in generating the knowledge that
is the basis for innovation. The U.S. Constitution states that patents are intended to

17

Coopers and Lybrand, L.L.P., “Partnerships Pay off for Growth Companies,” Trend Setter
Barometer, 6 January, 1997, available at [http://www/barometersurveys.com].
18

Patricia M. Danzon, Sean Nicholson, Nuno Sousa Pereira, Productivity in
Pharmaceutical-Biotechnology R&D: The Role of Experience and Alliances, National
Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 9615, April 2003, 5 available at
[http://www.nber.org/papers].
19

Ibid, 7

20

Francis Bidault and Thomas Cummings, “Innovating Through Alliances: Expectations and
Limitations,” R&D Management, January 1994, 33.
21

Edwin Mansfield, “Academic Research and Industrial Innovation: An Update of Empirical
Findings,” Research Policy 26, 1998, 775.
22

David Blumenthal, “Academic-Industrial Relationships in the Life Sciences,” The New
England Journal of Medicine, December 18, 2003, 2453.
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promote “the progress of science and the useful arts.” As research and development
become more expensive, ownership of title to inventions has been used by the federal
government as a means to foster increased private sector activities to generate new
and improved products and processes for the marketplace. In an academic setting,
the possession of title is expected to provide motivation for the university to license
the technology to industry for further refinement and application in expectation of
royalty payments.
The patent system is grounded in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the
Constitution and is intended to stimulate new discoveries and their reduction to
practice, commonly known as innovation. The grant of a patent provides the inventor
with a means to capture returns to his invention through exclusive rights on its
practice for 20 years from date of filing. This is designed to encourage those
investments necessary to further develop an idea and generate a marketable
technology. At the same time, the process of obtaining a patent places the concept
on which it is based in the public domain. In return for a time limited monopoly right
to specific applications of the knowledge generated, the inventor must publish the
ideas covered in the patent. As a disclosure system, the patent can, and often does,
stimulate other firms or individuals to invent “around” existing patents to provide for
parallel technical developments or meet similar and expanded demands in the
marketplace.23
The utility of patents to companies varies among industrial sectors. Patents are
perceived as critical in the drug and chemical industries. That may reflect the nature
of R&D performed in these sectors, where the results are relatively easy to
reproduce.24 Others have pointed out that drug patents are more detailed in their
claims and therefore easier to defend.25 In contrast, studies have found that in many
other industries the protection offered by patents is diminished by the ability to invent
around the patent and limited by the disclosure of vital information in the patent
itself.26 In the aircraft and semiconductor industries patents have not been the most
successful mechanism for capturing the benefits of investments. Instead, lead time
and the strength of the learning curve were determined to be more important.27
According to one recent study, in the semiconductor and related equipment industry,

23

For more information see CRS Report 97-599, Patents and Innovation: Issues in Patent
Reform, and CRS Report 98-862, R&D Partnerships and Intellectual Property: Implications
for U.S. Policy, both by Wendy H. Schacht.
24

Henry Grabowski, “Patents, Innovation and Access to New Pharmaceuticals,” Journal of
International Economic Law, December 2002, 849.
25

Levin, Richard C. and Alvin K Klevorick, Richard R. Nelson, and Sidney G. Winter.
Appropriating the Returns for Industrial Research and Development, Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity, 1987, printed in The Economics of Technical Change, ed. Edwin
Mansfield and Elizabeth Mansfield. (Vermont, Edward Elgar Publishing Co., 1993), 255
and 257.
26

Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson, and John P. Walsh, Protecting Their Intellectual
Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not),
NBER, February 2000, available at [http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552].
27

Appropriating the Returns for Industrial Research and Development, 253.
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secrecy and lead time were deemed significantly more important than patents.
Similar findings characterize the aerospace and machine tool industries, among
others.28 The degree to which industry perceives patents as effective has been
characterized as “positively correlated with the increase in duplication costs and time
associated with patents.”29
Innovation produces new knowledge. One characteristic of this knowledge is
that it is a “public good,” a good that is not consumed when it is used. This “public
good” concept underlies the U.S. patent system. As Professor John Shoven of
Stanford University points out, “The use of an idea or discovery by one person does
not, in most cases, reduce the availability of that information to others.”30 Therefore
the marginal social cost of the widespread application of that information is near zero
because the stock of knowledge is not depleted. This is why the federal government
funds basic research. “Ordinarily, society maximizes its welfare through not
charging for the use of a free good.”31 However, innovation typically is costly and
resource intensive. Patents permit novel concepts or discoveries to become
“property” when reduced to practice and therefore allow for control over their use.
They “create incentives that maximize the difference between the value of the
intellectual property that is created and used and the social cost of its creation.”32
The patent process is designed to resolve the problem of appropriability. If
discoveries were universally available without a means for the inventor to realize a
return on investments, most commentators are convinced that there would result a
“much lower and indeed suboptimal level of innovation.”33 While research is often
important to innovation, studies have shown that, on average, it constitutes only 25%
of the cost of commercializing a new technology or technique, thus requiring the
expenditure of a substantial amount of additional resources to bring most products
or processes to the marketplace. The grant of a patent provides the inventor with a
mechanism to capture the returns to his invention through exclusive rights on its
practice for 20 years from date of filing. That is intended to encourage those
investments necessary to further develop an idea and generate a marketable
technology.

28

Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S.
Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not), Table 1.
29

Appropriating the Returns for Industrial Research and Development, 269.

30

John B. Shoven, “Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Growth,” in eds. Charls
Walker and Mark A. Bloomfield, Intellectual Property Rights and Capital Formation in the
Next Decade, (New York, University Press of America, 1988), 46.
31

Robert P. Benko, “Intellectual Property Rights and New Technologies,” in Intellectual
Property Rights and Capital Formation in the Next Decade, 27.
32

Stanley M. Besen and Leo J. Raskind, “An Introduction to the Law and Economics of
Intellectual Property,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Winter 1991, 5.
33

Kenneth W. Dam, “The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law,” Journal of Legal
Studies, January 1994, 247.
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The patent system thus has dual policy goals — providing incentives for
inventors to invent and encouraging inventors to disclose technical information.34
Disclosure requirements are factors in achieving a balance between current and future
innovation through the patent process, as are limitations on scope, novelty mandates,
and nonobviousness considerations.35 Patents give rise to an environment of
competitiveness with multiple sources of innovation, which is viewed by some
experts as the basis for technological progress. This is important because, as Robert
Merges (Boston University) and Richard Nelson (Columbia University) found in
their studies, in a situation where only “a few organizations controlled the
development of a technology, technical advance appeared sluggish.”36

Legislative Initiatives
Reflecting the importance of cooperative R&D to the government, a series of
legislative provisions use intellectual property rights to foster collaboration between
all the parties in the research and development enterprise leading to the generation
of new and improved products and processes for the marketplace. Both P.L. 96-418,
the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act (known as the “Stevenson-Wydler
Act”),37 as amended, and P.L. 96-517, Amendments to the Patent and Trademark Act
(commonly referred to as the “Bayh-Dole Act” after its two main sponsors, former
Senators Birch Bayh and Robert Dole),38 are the basis for efforts at using patents and
licensing to facilitate cooperative R&D, technology transfer, and the
commercialization of technology supported by the federal government. These laws
affect the way the National Institutes of Health, and other government agencies,
interact with the academic community and industry in the R&D arena. It is in this
area where the sometimes competing goals of prescription drug cost containment and
encouragement of technology-based innovations may conflict.
While the result of different legislative histories and concerns, the StevensonWydler Act and the Bayh-Dole Act were passed to encourage the use of technologies
funded by and/or developed by the federal government in pursuit of the departments’
and agencies’ mission requirements. However, they address intellectual property
issues that arise from different R&D relationships. The Stevenson-Wydler Act
contains provisions concerning assignment of title to inventions arising from
collaborative work between federal laboratories and outside cooperating parties
34

Robert P. Merges, “Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives
on Innovation,” California Law Review, July 1988, 876.
35

The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 266-267. Scope is determined by the
number of claims made in a patent. Claims are the technical descriptions associated with
the invention. In order for an idea to receive a patent, the law requires that it be “. . .new,
useful [novel], and nonobvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to which the invention
pertains.”

36

Robert P. Merges and Richard R. Nelson, “On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope,”
Columbia Law Review, May 1990, 908.
37

15 U.S.C. sec. 3701 and following

38

35 U.S.C. sec. 200 and following
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where no direct federal funding is involved. The Bayh-Dole Act primarily addresses
the distribution of patents resulting from federally-funded research and development
performed by outside organizations and prescribes the licensing of governmentowned inventions.39

The Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act
P.L. 96-480, the Stevenson-Wydler Act, as amended, was enacted to encourage
use of technologies developed in the federal laboratory system. This is to be
accomplished by technology transfer, the process by which technology generated in
one organization, in one area, or for one purpose is applied in another organization,
in another area, or for another purpose. In the defense and space arenas it is often
called “spin-off.” The original Act, provided federal departments and agencies with
a mandate to transfer technology as well as established mechanisms by which to
accomplish this goal. P.L. 99-502, the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 and
P.L. 101-189, the FY1990 Department of Defense Authorizations, amended the law
and created cooperative research and development agreements (CRADAs) as a means
to undertake the transfer activity.
A CRADA is a specific legal document (not a procurement contract) that
defines the collaborative venture. It is intended to be developed at the laboratory
level, with limited agency review. The work performed must be consistent with the
laboratory’s mission. In pursuing these joint efforts, the laboratory may accept funds,
personnel, services, and property from the collaborating party and may provide
personnel, services, and property to the participating organization. The government
can cover overhead costs incurred in support of the CRADA, but is expressly
prohibited from providing direct funding to the industrial partner.
The act does not specify the dispensation of patents derived from the
collaborative work, allowing agencies to develop their own policies. At the least, the
law permits the non-federal collaborating party the “option to choose an exclusive
license for a pre-negotiated field of use for any such invention under the agreement.”
The laboratory director also may negotiate licensing agreements for related
government-owned inventions previously made at that laboratory to facilitate
cooperative ventures.
In all cases, the government retains certain rights, including a “nonexclusive,
nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up license to practice the invention or have the
invention practiced throughout the world by or on behalf of the Government for
research or other Government purposes.” Under “exceptional circumstances,” the
government may exercise its right to require a party, to which it assigned title or
granted exclusive license to an invention, to license the technology to another
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organization if it is necessary to address health and safety needs not being addressed;
to meet requirements for public use specified by federal regulation not being met; or
if the cooperating party has not performed its obligations as specified in the
agreement.
Preference in determining CRADAs is given to small businesses, companies
that will manufacture in the United States, or foreign firms from countries that permit
American companies to enter into similar arrangements. According to Senate report
99-283 that accompanied the legislation, “the authorities conveyed by [the section
dealing with CRADAs] are permissive” to promote the widest use of this
arrangement.40
It should be noted that CRADAs are only one form of cooperative activity, but
because they can be easily identified and quantified they tend to be the most visible.
Other mechanisms include personnel exchanges and visits; licensing of patents; work
for others; educational initiatives; information dissemination; the use of special
laboratory facilities and centers set up in particular technological areas; cooperative
assistance to state and local programs; and the spinoff of new firms. Currently,
federal laboratories legislatively are prohibited from competing with the private
sector and can only offer the use of expertise and equipment which is not readily
available elsewhere. Technology transfer and cooperative efforts are expressly
forbidden to interfere with the laboratories’ R&D mission-related activities.

The Bayh-Dole Act
P.L. 96-517, the Bayh-Dole Act, evolved out of congressional interest in
developing a uniform federal patent policy to promote the utilization of inventions
made with the support of the federal research establishment.41 Such action was
deemed necessary because, at the time the legislation was under consideration, only
5% of federally-owned patents were being used. While there were several possible
reasons for such a low level of utilization (including no market applications), this
was thought by many to be one consequence of the practice by most agencies of
taking title to all inventions made with government funding while only permitting the
nonexclusive licensing of contractor inventions.42 Without title to inventions, or at
least exclusive licenses, companies may be less likely to engage in and fund the
additional R&D necessary to bring an idea to the marketplace. The Bayh-Dole Act,
by providing universities, nonprofit institutions, and small businesses with ownership
of patents arising from federally-funded R&D, offers an incentive for cooperative
work and commercial application. Royalties derived from intellectual property rights
provides the academic community an alternative way to support further research and
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the business sector a means to obtain a return on their financial contribution to the
endeavor.
Each nonprofit organization (including universities) or small business is
permitted to elect (within a reasonable time frame) to retain title to any “subject
invention” made as a result of R&D funded by the federal government; except under
“exceptional circumstances when it is determined by the agency that restriction or
elimination of the right to retain title to any subject invention will better promote the
policy and objectives of this chapter.”43 The owner of the intellectual property must
commit to commercialization of the patent within a predetermined time frame agreed
to by the supporting agency and the performing organization. As stated in the House
report to accompany the bill, “the legislation establishes a presumption [emphasis
added] that ownership of all patent rights in government funded research will vest in
any contractor who is a nonprofit research institution or a small business.”44
Certain rights are reserved for the government to protect the public interest. The
government retains “a nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up license to
practice or have practiced for or on behalf of the United States any subject invention
throughout the world....” The government also retains “march-in rights” that enable
the federal agency to require the contractor (whether he owns title or has an exclusive
license) to “grant a nonexclusive, partially exclusive, or exclusive license in any field
of use to a responsible applicant or applicants...” with due compensation, or to grant
a license itself under certain circumstances. The special situation necessary to trigger
march-in rights involves a determination that the contractor has not made efforts to
commercialize within an agreed upon time frame or that the “action is necessary to
alleviate health or safety needs. . .” that are not being met by the contractor (15
U.S.C. sec. 203).
The Bayh-Dole Act also addresses the licensing of inventions to which the
government retained title typically because of past agency practices or because of a
public interest. Title 35 U.S.C. §209 proscribes the licensing of this type of
invention. The law permits federal departments to offer nonexclusive, exclusive, or
partially exclusive licenses under certain conditions and with specific rights retained
by the government. These include the right to terminate the license if
commercialization is not pursued as provided in the business plan or if the
government needs the license for public use. The agencies are required to inform the
public about the availability of a patent for licensing. Notices are to be published in
the Federal Register for a period of three months and if a company displays intent
to license, the laboratory must place an additional notice and offer 60 days for
objections. In providing licenses, small businesses are given preferences and
licensees must agree that “any products embodying the invention or produced
through the use of the invention will be manufactured substantially in the United
States.”
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NIH-University-Industry Collaboration: The Results
The primary mission of the National Institutes of Health “is to acquire new
knowledge through the conduct and support of biomedical research to improve the
health of the American people.” To achieve this, NIH funds $27 billion of both inhouse and extramural R&D; 10% of this total is for work within NIH laboratories and
80% goes to contractors, primarily universities and non-profit research institutions.45
Simultaneously, the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act and the BayhDole Act provide the agency with the “statutory mandate to ensure that new
technologies developed in those laboratories are transferred to the private sector and
commercialized in an expeditious and efficient manner.”46 Thus, NIH is faced with
two interrelated goals: “promoting the health of the American people and all mankind
through research in the biosciences, and fostering a vigorous domestic biotechnology
industry.”47 While the legislation discussed in this paper provides a general
framework within which to achieve some of these objectives, there are specific issues
associated with health research that have generated concerns not raised in other
industrial sectors. Given the particular interest in health-related R&D, the increased
commercial potential, and cost considerations, questions are being raised within
Congress as to the adequacy of current arrangements. Most experts agree that closer
cooperation can augment funding sources (both in the public and private sectors),
increase technology transfer, stimulate additional innovation, lead to new products
and processes, and expand markets. Yet, others point out that collaboration may
provide an increased opportunity for unfair advantages, excessive private sector
profits at the expense of the public, conflicts of interest, redirection of research, and
less openness in sharing of scientific discovery.

Intramural Research
Intramural research performed at the National Institutes of Health accounts for
approximately 10% of the NIH budget. Typically, NIH keeps title to inventions
made in its laboratories. In FY2006, NIH scientists filed 367 invention disclosures
and 173 new patent applications, while 93 patents were issued to NIH. During that
year, 254 licenses were executed and $82.7.7 million in royalties collected on
existing licenses. This is in contrast to 10 years earlier in FY1996 when 196
inventions were disclosed, 136 patent applications filed, and 127 patents issued. At
that time, 184 licenses were executed and royalty payments totaled $27 million.
Over the FY1996-FY2006 time period, $586.9 million in royalties were generated
on NIH-owned patents that were licensed48.
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As of December 2006, NIH has identified 25 FDA approved products that have
been developed with technology from the NIH intramural research program.49 It
should be noted that NIH did not develop the final product; technologies derived
from NIH supported research are involved in producing or administering the
product.50 According to the General Accounting Office (now the Government
Accountability Office), NIH was responsible for 95% of the royalties collected by six
agencies (Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, Department of the Air
Force, Department of Energy, and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration) studied between 1996 and 1998. In addition, NIH had the largest
number of licensing agreements.51 A report by the Department of Commerce found
that income from technologies licensed by the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) accounted for 56% of the total amount of license fees collected by
all federal laboratories during FY2003. The number of licenses issued by HHS
comprised 21% of the total number of licenses, second only to the Department of
Energy.52
Policies. The articulated policy of the Public Health Service (PHS), the parent
agency of NIH, as well as the Food and Drug Administration, and the Centers for
Disease Control, is to “ensure that new technologies developed in those laboratories
are transferred to the private sector and commercialized in an expeditious and
efficient manner” while protecting the public interest.53 The policies associated with
the patenting and licensing of inventions made within NIH are designed to “balance
new product development with appropriate market competition.”54
Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs) must reflect
the mission requirements of NIH and not divert resources from the agency’s
mandate.55 It also is expected that scientific input from the collaborating party will
advance the capabilities of government scientists in their work. In this environment,
ideas and results are to be discussed openly. Publication of the knowledge generated
49

National Institutes of Health, FDA Approved Therapeutic Drugs and Vaccines Developed
with Technologies From the Intramural Research Program at the National Institutes of
Health, available at [http://ott.od.nih.gov].
50

Mark L. Rohrbaugh, NIH: Moving Research from the Bench to the Bedside, Testimony
before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Health, July 10,
2003 available at [http://ott.od.nih.gov].
51

General Accounting Office, Technology Transfer: Number and Characteristics of
Inventions Licensed by Six Federal Agencies, GAO/RCED-99-173, June 1999, 6, 7.
52

Office of the Secretary, U.S. Department of Commerce, Summary Report on Federal
Laboratory Technology Transfer, December 2004, 10 and 11, available at
[http://www.technology.gov/reports/TechTrans/2004_Sum.pdf]
53

Public Health Service (PHS) Patent Policy

54

National Institutes of Health, A Plan to Ensure Taxpayers’ Interests are Protected,
“Technology Transfer Mission Statement,” Appendix A-3.3, July 2001, available at
[http://ott.nih.gov/policy/policy/policy_protect_text.html].
55

Office of Technology Transfer, National Institutes of Health, Cooperative Research and
Development Agreements (CRADAs) and Material Transfer Agreements (MTAs), available
at [http://ott.od.nih.gov/cradas/model_agree.html].

CRS-15
by NIH-supported research is required, after providing time to apply for patent
protection. To support the transfer of technology and the widespread use of the
intellectual property, as well as to further
a longstanding tradition of scientific freedom, PHS research results are published
freely. Publication of research is not to be significantly delayed for the purpose
of either filing patent applications on patentable subject matter, or conducting
further research to develop patentable subject matter.56

NIH practice is to patent inventions arising from intramural R&D within the
provisions of the law and to transfer the technology through the use of licensing
whenever possible instead of assignment of patent title to the outside entity. The
organization “will seek patent protection on biomedical technologies only when a
patent facilitates availability of the technology to the public for preventive,
diagnostic, therapeutic, or research use, or other commercial use.”57 Under a
CRADA,
the producing Party will retain ownership of and title to all CRADA Subject
Inventions, all copies of CRADA Data, and all CRADA Materials produced
solely by its employee(s). The Parties will own jointly all CRADA Subject
Inventions invented jointly and all copies of CRADA Data and all CRADA
Materials developed jointly.58

Typically, the collaborating party has the option to elect an exclusive (or
nonexclusive) license to any subject invention not made solely by an employee of this
collaborating entity. Accordingly, the terms of the license
will fairly reflect the nature of the CRADA Subject Invention, the relative
contributions of the Parties to the CRADA Subject Invention and the CRADA,
a plan for the development and marketing of the CRADA Subject Invention, the
risks incurred by the Collaborator and the costs of subsequent research and
development needed to bring the invention to the marketplace.59

Decisions on licensing are to be made to “ensure development of each
technology for the broadest possible applications, optimizing the number of products
developed from PHS technology.” Thus, non-exclusive or co-exclusive licenses are
used if possible; exclusive licenses are to be for specific indications or fields of use.
When a mandatory exclusive license is used as under a CRADA, NIH requires that
the licensee grant sublicenses to “broaden the development possibilities when
necessary for the public health.” The resulting technology is to be made available for
research purposes. Technologies licensed to industry are required to be expeditiously
commercialized, “offered and maintained for sale, and made reasonably accessible
to the public.” The public interest is maintained through efforts to encourage
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development of competing products and through royalty-bearing licenses that reflect
“a fair financial return on the public’s research investment.”60
Fair Pricing Clause. Prior to 1995, NIH had included what was known as
a “fair pricing clause” in its cooperative research and development agreements and
many licensing arrangements. In 1989, the Public Health Service (PHS) instituted
a policy addressing the pricing of products resulting from a government-owned
patent licensed by NIH on an exclusive basis to industry or an invention jointly
developed with industry under a CRADA and then licensed exclusively to the
collaborator. The language used in the contract stated:
Because of [NIH’s] responsibilities and the public investment in research that
contributes to a product licensed under a CRADA, DHHS [Department of Health
and Human Services] has a concern that there be a reasonable relationship
between the pricing of a licensed product, the public investment in that product,
and the health and safety needs of the public. Accordingly, exclusive
commercialization licenses granted for the NIH intellectual property rights may
require that this relationship be supported by reasonable evidence.61

While there was no statutory requirement mandating this type of clause, it was
instituted in response to public and political pressures resulting from concern over
the cost of AZT, a drug used in the treatment of HIV infection. However, according
to the NIH, “AZT was not developed under a CRADA or exclusive license nor, to
date, has it been determined that the government has a patentable interest in this
medication.”62 No other federal department or agency, with the exception of the
Bureau of Mines, had established such a requirement.
The clause was removed in 1995 at the request of Dr. Harold Varmus, then
Director of NIH, after a review of the situation and several public hearings. He
concluded that the evidence indicated “the pricing clause has driven industry away
from potentially beneficial scientific collaborations with PHS scientists without
providing an offsetting benefit to the public.”63 While sharing concerns over the
“potential inaccessibility” of drugs due to costs, “NIH [agreed] with the consensus
of the advisory panels that enforcement of a pricing clause would divert NIH from
its primary research mission and conflict with its statutory mission to transfer
promising technologies to the private sector for commercialization.”64 A study by the
Department of Health and Human Services Inspector General found that companies
viewed the clause as a major problem in the NIH CRADA approach.65 Opponents
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of the clause argued that the uncertainty of the pricing clause exacerbated a process
already fraught with risk. According to industry sources, not knowing what the
determination of “fair” pricing would be at the end of a long and expensive research,
development, and commercialization process was a strong deterrent to entering into
cooperative arrangements. Many of the pharmaceutical and biotechnology
companies declined to undertake CRADAs. Some firms even declined opportunities
for joint clinical trials with NIH in anticipation of future price control demands. At
the public hearings most of the patient advocacy groups called for repeal of the fair
pricing clause.
NIH reportedly was reluctant to make definitive decisions on pricing. At that
time, reasonable pricing was defined as a price within the range of existing
therapies.66 However, a differentiation was made between the reasonable pricing
clause and “price setting:” the latter was seen as regulation and had been considered
inappropriate for NIH. According to testimony of Dr. Bernadine Healy, then
Director of NIH, the laboratory was “probably...unqualified” to undertake drug
pricing because it has not been involved in such activities. Instead, NIH “should
approach fair pricing as a co-inventor of a fundamental discovery and use...leverage
as an agency that knows what we brought to the table.” Dr. Healy maintained that
the laboratory should not be “too intrusive” or get “too involved in the financial and
proprietary activities of companies.”67
The effect of abandoning the clause was immediate. Subsequent to rescission
of the clause in April 1995, the number of CRADAs executed by NIH increased
substantially (see Table 1).

Extramural Research
Extramural research, primarily at universities or medical centers, comprises the
major portion of NIH research funding (approximately 84% of the total). Under law
mandated by the Bayh-Dole Act, federal departments and agencies do not retain title
to inventions made with government funding when the research is performed by an
outside contractor. Since the federal organization does own the patent, it does not
receive royalty payments for any licensing agreements. Nor does the agency have
direct say, other than as provided in the Bayh-Dole Act, in the way these technologies
are commercialized.68
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Figure 1. NIH CRADAs
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Across all technology areas, the Bayh-Dole Act appears to be successful in
facilitating the commercialization of technology.69 The latest licensing survey by the
Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) found that in FY2004, 567
new commercial products were brought to market, 462 new companies were created,
and $1.4 billion in royalties were generated as a result of technology transfer from the
academic community.70 In 1980, 390 patents were awarded to universities;71 by
2003, this number increased to 3,259.72 While these figures include all types of
R&D, funding for university research in the life sciences comprises by far the largest
portion of academic research support. In 2004, 51% of total R&D expenditures at
academic institutions went to finance the medical and biological sciences.73 The
federal government remains the primary source of this funding.
The use of this academic research, funded in large part by the federal
government, appears to be particularly important to the business community. Studies
have found that “growth companies with university ties have productivity rates
almost two-thirds higher than peers....”74 In the pharmaceutical industry, over onequarter of new drugs depended on academic research for timely commercialization.75
Further, there is evidence demonstrating that public science, “research performed in
and supported by governmental, academic and charitable research institutions,” plays
a crucial role in private sector technology development.76 Work prepared for the
National Science Foundation indicated that “public science plays an essential role in
supporting U.S. industry, across all the science-linked areas of industry, amongst
companies large and small, and is a fundamental pillar of the advance of U.S.
technology.”77 This research demonstrated that of the papers cited in patents granted
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to U.S. companies during the years 1987-1988 and 1993-1994, 73% were authored
at academic, governmental, and other public facilities (domestic or foreign) as
compared with 27% from industrial sources. The biomedical community relies on
this basic work more heavily than other industries with 79% of drug and medicine
patents citing the results of public science.78
A May 2000 internal study on NIH Contributions to Pharmaceutical
Development and a U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee report on The Benefits
of Medical Research and the Role of the NIH issued the same time, document the
part government funded research plays in drug development.79 Scientists supported
by the government “contributed by discovering basic phenomena and concepts,
developing new techniques and assays, and participated in clinical applications of the
drugs.”80 While it is often many years before the research is utilized to generate
marketable results, top selling pharmaceuticals “are the result of a great deal of basic
research on the disease mechanism which allowed more specific targeting of the
underlying problem.”81 Federal funding is also important in the search for new and
additional uses for existing drugs since private sector firms will not use a technology
covered by a patent because of infringement issues.82
Results of a study by Andrew Toole at Stanford University demonstrated that
“federally funded basic research is a positive and significant contributing factor in
pharmaceutical product innovation.”83 However, it is often particularly difficult to
exactly identify the government’s contribution to a new drug, particularly since a
product typically embodies more than one patent. Generally, there are multiple
sources of input from multiple parties in drug development. This is demonstrated by
NIH’s detailed analysis of the top 5 drugs with sales of over $1 billion in 1994 and
1995 cited above. In its 2000 case study, NIH found that
[r]esearch may be targeted to the cure of a particular disease, or aimed at
understanding basic mechanisms and gaining knowledge for which no immediate
application is apparent. Disease-targeted research can be effective in fueling
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progress in a given area. However, just as often results from other fields of
research led to breakthroughs in disease concepts or in drug discovery. These
five drugs all arose from both disease-specific and unrelated fields of research.84

In response to congressional direction, the National Institutes of Health looked
at 47 FDA-approved drugs that had sales of $500 million or more a year to determine
the role of NIH-sponsored technologies in their development. As described in the
resulting July 2001 report, A Plan to Ensure Taxpayers’ Interests are Protected,
“NIH sought to determine whether the agency, directly, or through a grantee or
contractor, held any patent rights to the drugs.”85 NIH funded technologies were
found to have been used in the development of four of these pharmaceuticals:
Epogen® and Procrit® are based on different uses of a patented process
technology developed at Columbia University with support from NIH grants.
Columbia licensed their technology to Amgen for Epogen® and to Johnson &
Johnson for Procrit®.
Neupogen® is manufactured by Amgen using patented technologies for a process
and a composition licensed from Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center
(MSKCC). These technologies were developed with NIH grant support.
Taxol® is manufactured by Bristol Myers Squibb (BMS) using a patented
process technology developed by Florida State University (FSU) with NIH grant
funds. In addition, the NIH has rights to an underlying technology arising from
a NIH CRADA collaboration with BMS. The NIH has received from BMS tens
of millions of dollars in royalties from FY1997 to FY2000 under the license to
the NIH technology.86

A later study by GAO found that government financial support of extramural
research and development had resulted in inventions that “were used to make only
6 brand name drugs associated with the top 100 pharmaceuticals that VA [the
Veteran’s Administration] procured for use by veterans and 4 brand name drugs
associated with the top 100 pharmaceuticals that DOD dispensed in 2001.”87 What
these, and other reports document is that “while NIH’s federally funded research has
contributed in a substantial, dramatic, yet general, way to advances in medicine and
biology, the direct contributions to a final therapeutic product as a consequence of
the Bayh-Dole process is limited and difficult to determine.”88 In addition to multiple
sources of innovation, tracking the federal contribution is made more difficult by the
fact that the government does not retain ownership of inventions made by
contractors.
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Issues and Options
The actual and expected benefits flowing from the biomedical community go
beyond economic consideration of the importance of technological progress to the
Nation. The potential life saving quality of many of the products associated with this
type of R&D provides an additional dimension. In addition to the opportunities to
generate profits on sales of products, provide jobs, and stimulate investments,
advances in biotechnology and pharmaceuticals also can facilitate economic growth
through improvements in productivity resulting from a healthier population. Frank
Lichtenberg (Columbia University Graduate School of Business) suggests that the
benefits of new drugs include “longer life, better quality of life, and reductions in
total medical expenditure.”89

Pricing Decisions and Recoupment
Federal support for health-related R&D amounts to approximately 23% of the
total federal R&D budget, second only to the R&D funding spent for defense.90 The
sizable public sector investment has raised the issue of a more direct return to the
federal government and taxpayers for their support of R&D. The significant portion
of public resources spent by the government in this arena, and provided to the private
sector at no cost, has prompted some observers to call for government involvement
in the establishment of some pharmaceutical prices. Others argue that the
government should “recoup” its investment from firms using federally supported
R&D after profits are generated.
Such suggestions are based on several factors. In addition to funding research
performed by individual companies, under certain circumstances, the government
furnishes the private sector ownership of the intellectual property resulting from this
public investment. Patent protection gives firms monopoly rights on these
innovations for a specified amount of time. Concurrently, the government has
conveyed added and substantial financial, regulatory, and tax advantages through
legislation such as the Hatch-Waxman Act and the Orphan Drug Act. According to
one commentator, “the drug industry was able to grow rapidly not only because its
structure evolved in an atmosphere relatively free from close examination, but also
because it developed in a fairly unrestrictive regulatory setting.”91 Another critic of
existing policy, Daniel Zingale, formerly the executive director of AIDS Action,
offered the following analogy: “imagine if General Motors could get the American
taxpayer to heavily subsidize its research and development, fund government
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programs that purchase half of its cars and then get many of those same taxpayers to
buy a new car each and every year.”92
Several years ago, an investigation of health-related R&D by the Boston Globe’s
Spotlight Team led them to conclude that pharmaceutical companies are
“piggybacking on government research” and then charging “onerous prices.”93 In the
article it was argued that “by funding the early stages of research and testing, NIH
assumes great risk while reaping few financial rewards.” The Globe’s research
indicated that 45 of 50 top-selling drugs resulted from government funding of
approximately $175 million. “The average net profit margin of the companies
making those drugs was 14 percent in 1997, more than double the 6 percent average
for industrial companies in the Standard & Poor’s 500.”
The government typically funds basic research because the resulting knowledge
is considered a public good. It is often assumed that incentives, including patent
protection, encourage firms to take steps to bring the results of this fundamental
research to market. However, it also has been argued that health care has both public
and private benefits and is therefore not a classical public good.94 By providing
patent protection to the results of federally-funded research, a company receives an
individual benefit based upon public investments. According to one observer, the
suggestion that incentives for drug development, particularly patent protection, are
necessary for innovation in this field may be “exaggerated, given governmental
subsidization of research and development costs.”95 The public investment in R&D
“replaces some portion of the patent-conferred incentives that are necessary to
encourage companies to undertake privately financed research.”96 For example, it has
been argued that the high prices associated with AIDs-related drugs can not be
attributed to the high cost of R&D and a lengthy regulatory process because of the
substantial federal investment in such research and fast track approval of these
drugs.97
Proponents of recoupment and/or federal cost controls assert that the monopoly
power of patents should be modified by “public subsidization”98 They contend that
the public has a right to a return on its investment. However, certain observers claim
that “this right is not preserved under the patent system, which ascribes solely to the
patent holder all proprietary rights and interests in the patented product or process.”
The “extraordinary gains” generated by prices on the resulting drugs “cannot be
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explained by the usual ‘incentives’ rationale for conferring patent monopolies.”
Instead, those who favor government input into price decisions maintain that the
prices of the resulting pharmaceuticals and therapeutics should reflect the public
contribution to these products and processes. “In other words, public support of
quasi-public goods must be balanced by some degree of public sharing in the fruits
of the investment, as well as input into the nature of that sharing.”
Critics of policies to recoup federal research support or government involvement
in pricing decisions argue that advocates of such actions misunderstand the actual
nature of the NIH role in research and pharmaceutical development. Federal support
for basic research reflects a consensus that such work is critical because it is the
foundation for many new innovations. However, any returns created by this activity
are generally long term, sometimes not marketable, and not always evident. Yet the
rate of return to society as a whole generated by investments in research is
significantly larger than the benefits that can be captured by the firm performing the
work. According to a study by Iain Cockburn of Boston University and Rebecca
Henderson of MIT, the rate of return to government funded biomedical research may
be 30% a year, a figure that may actually be higher because calculations do not
account for the broader effects of pharmaceutical innovation on health and wellbeing.99
The National Institutes of Health funds “basic research aimed at understanding
biological mechanisms and gaining knowledge for which no immediate application
is apparent has been a vital supply of new ideas, and can only be sustained through
public support.100 This fundamental knowledge contributes to the general pool of
knowledge which industry may use to generate specific products. In the healthrelated arena, NIH supports research, primarily at universities, directed at the
underlying mechanisms of disease; research and knowledge that are applied by the
private sector to develop specific treatments for disease.101 Studies demonstrate the
“important role that the public sector plays in providing fundamental insights in basic
knowledge as a basis for drug discovery.102
The basic research “feeds an
independent step in the discovery process called the ‘drug concept’ or ‘rock turning’
period...[which] is the very first point in the pharmaceutical innovative process and
necessarily precedes chemical synthesis.”103 This basic research generally is
composed of work supported by the government and publicly available and
knowledge resulting from internal firm R&D.104 The information and concepts
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generated by this research have a “substantial impact” on pharmaceutical R&D.105
According to NIH:
The research supported and conducted by the NIH is sometimes mischaracterized
as necessarily resulting in the commercialization of drug products. In truth,
much of NIH funding supports the exploration of fundamental biological
mechanisms that would otherwise not be pursued due to the lack of market
incentives. Such research can lead to early-stage findings and provide clues tht
may eventually lead to medical advancements for diseases for which existing
methods of therapy are nonexistent, inefficient, or suitable only for a select
population.106

This is not to imply that the private sector does little in relation to the
government in the pharmaceutical arena. Pharmaceutical companies spend more than
NIH on R&D; primarily for applied research and development directed at generating
new drugs for the marketplace. Some analysts argue that the federal role is
overstated because existing studies use citations as a measure of each sector’s
contribution to drug development. This, critics maintain, skews the results because
the government encourages, and even requires, publication of research results while
industry often discourages such practices.107
What appears to be the case is that benefits move in both directions between the
government and the private sector.108 A comprehensive study by NIH of 5 top
selling drugs demonstrated “that public and private sector biomedical research are
interwoven, complementary parts of the highly successful U.S. biomedical science
endeavor.”109 Taking the results of this study further, Janice Reichert and
Christopher-Paul Milne of the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development at
Tufts University noted that for the set of drugs looked at by NIH, the government’s
involvement
was greatest in the preclinical and clinical development of drugs that were
treatments for serious or life-threatening diseases . . .[where] there was clearly
a public health benefit derived from facilitating the development of these drugs.
The NIH was also involved in the discovery and/or development of compounds
that were in the “public domain” (ie, knowledge of the existence and method of
preparation of the compounds was publicly available before therapeutic potential
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was identified)...These types of compounds initially might not have been of
interest to the pharmaceutical industry, because possible patent claims were
limited.110

Those who oppose changes in the current approach to intellectual property
ownership of the results of federally funded R&D maintain that the promise of a large
return on investment “is precisely the tool sanctioned by the Constitution to promote
the progress of science.”111 It is because pharmaceuticals and biotechnology are so
research intensive that they rely heavily on patents. Intellectual property is important
because the “costs of drug innovation are very high while the costs of imitation are
relatively low.”112 The domestic pharmaceutical industry typically reinvests 8 to
20% of its revenues in R&D, and oftentimes substantially more, in contrast to other
industries where the rates are about 3 to 4%, according to testimony presented by
Dr.Arthur Levinson, CEO of Genentech.113 Ownership of intellectual property is
particularly important to biotechnology companies that typically are small and do not
have profits to finance additional R&D. According to the Biotechnology Industry
Organization, most of these firms finance research and development from equity
capital not profits. Only 5% of biotech companies have sales and therefore depend
on venture capital and IPOs.114 Industry sources maintain the patents are a necessity
for raising this equity capital and that price controls would deter investors.115 Thus,
some experts maintain that “the ability of companies to control their discoveries
through the establishment of intellectual property rights is fundamental to the
competitiveness of [such] industry.”116
Elimination of the incentives associated with technology transfer and increased
R&D through patent ownership and control over intellectual property would reduce
innovation according to many experts. Columbia University’s Frank Lichtenberg
states that “weakening patent protection (e.g. by government violation of patents)
may have a chilling effect on private R&D investment, and therefore reduce the
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health and wealth of future generations.”117 A similar opinion was expressed by John
E. Calfee of the American Enterprise Institute. Noting that, “one of the leastappreciated effects of faster research and development is to quicken the competitive
process itself,” Calfee argues that “although the scientific effort required for new
drugs costs a great deal of money, the drugs are worth far more than they cost.
Eliminate the financial reward, however, and you cut off the supply.”118
Dr. M. Kathy Behrens, a director of the National Venture Capital Association,
testified at hearings before the Joint Economic Committee on September 29, 1999
that “health care proposals which impose drug price controls, or Medicare drug
benefits which provide marginal reimbursement, can create a perception or reality
that the industry’s potential return is limited or at greater risk.”119 Other experts
concur with this assessment. Research undertaken by John Vernon (University of
Pennsylvania) found “that pharmaceutical price regulation has a negative effect on
firm R&D investment...[and] could impose a very high cost in terms of foregone
medical innovation.”120 Other work has suggested that the threat of price controls
during the first Clinton Administration had a detrimental effect on private sector
support of pharmaceutical research and development.121
Actual experience and cited studies point to the conclusion that companies
which do not control the results of their investments — either through ownership of
patent title, exclusive license, or pricing decisions — tend to be less likely to engage
in related R&D. This fact is reflected in the provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act (as well
as other laws). Providing universities, nonprofit institutions, and small businesses
with title to patents arising from federally funded R&D offers an incentive for
cooperative work and commercial application. Royalties derived from intellectual
property rights provide the academic community an alternative way to support further
research and the business sector a means to obtain a return on their financial
contribution to the endeavor. While the idea of recoupment was considered by the
Congress in hearings on the legislation prior to the act’s passage in 1980, it was
rejected as an unnecessary obstacle, one which would be perceived as an additional
burden to working with the government. Policy makers thought such a program to
be particularly difficult to administer. Instead, Congress accepted as satisfactory the
anticipated payback to the country through increased revenues from taxes on profits,
new jobs created, improved productivity, and economic growth. For example,
according to the MIT Technology Licensing Office, 15% of the sales of licensed
products derived from federally funded university research is returned to the
government in the form of income taxes, payroll taxes, capital gains taxes, and
corporate income taxes. This is estimated to be 6 times the royalties paid by
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companies to the universities.122 The emergence of the biotechnology industry and
the development of new therapeutics to improve health care are other cited
indications of such benefits. These benefits generally have been considered more
important than the initial cost of the technology to the government or any potential
unfair advantage.

Research Tools
The focus on intellectual property ownership of the results of federally funded
R&D has led critics to charge that the patenting of fundamental research prevents
further biomedical innovation. Law professors Rebecca Eisenberg (University of
Michigan) and Arti Rai (University of Pennsylvania) argue that due to
implementation of the Bayh-Dole Act “[p]roprietary claims have increasingly moved
upstream from the end products themselves to the ground-breaking discoveries that
made them possible in the first place.”123 While patents are designed to spur
innovation, Rai and Eisenberg maintain that certain patents hinder the process. From
their perspective, permitting universities to patent discoveries made under federal
funding, the Bayh-Dole Act “draws no distinction between inventions that lead
directly to commercial products and fundamental advances that enable further
scientific studies.”124 These basic innovations are generally known as “research
tools.”
Eisenberg and Richard Nelson of Columbia University argue that ownership of
research tools may “impose significant transaction costs” that result in delayed
innovation and possible future litigation.125 It also can stand in the way of research
by others:
Broad claims on early discoveries that are fundamental to emerging fields of
knowledge are particularly worrisome in light of the great value, demonstrated
time and again in history of science and technology, of having many independent
minds at work trying to advance a field. Public science has flourished by
permitting scientists to challenge and build upon the work of rivals.126

Similar concerns were expressed by Harold Varmus, President of Memorial SloanKettering and former Director of the National Institutes of Health. In July 2000
prepared testimony, he spoke to being “troubled by widespread tendencies to seek
protection of intellectual property increasingly early in the process that ultimately
leads to products of obvious commercial value, because such practices can have
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detrimental effects on science and its delivery of health benefits.”127 While the BayhDole Act and scientific advances have helped generate a dynamic biotechnology
industry, there have been changes that “are not always consistent with the best
interests of science.”128
However, as Varmus and others acknowledge, the remedies to this situation are
not necessarily associated with the Bayh-Dole Act or its implementation by NIH.
Yale President Richard Levin notes that while some research should be kept in the
public domain, including research tools, the fact that it is privatized is not the result
of the Bayh-Dole Act, but rather the result of patent law made by the courts and the
Congress. Therefore, he believes that changes to the act are not the appropriate
means to address the issues.129
Current law, as reaffirmed by court decisions, permits the patenting of research
tools. However, there have been efforts to encourage the widespread availability of
these tools. Marie Freire, formerly Director of the Office of Technology Transfer at
NIH, testified that the value to society is greatest if the research tools are easily
available for use in research. She asserted that there is a need to balance commercial
interests with public interests.130 To achieve this balance, the National Institutes of
Health has developed guidelines for universities and companies receiving federal
funding that make clear research tools are to be made available to other scientists
under reasonable terms.131 In 1999, NIH issued a policy paper, Sharing of Biomedical
Research Resources, Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research
Grants and Contracts, which “calls for the sharing of [research] tools among nonprofit organizations with minimal terms and impediments.”132 This approach, now
included as a requirement in NIH grants, is reflective of subsequent changes to the
Bayh-Dole Act that stated the results of the federal R&D enterprise should be
achieved “without unduly encumbering future research and discovery....”133 In
addition, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office made changes in the guidelines used
to determine the patentability of biotechnology discoveries.
A study by Professors John Walsh (University of Illinois, Chicago), Ashish
Arora (Carnegie Mellon University), and Wesley Cohen (Duke University) found that
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although there are now more patents associated with biomedical research, and on
more fundamental work, there is little evidence that work has been curtailed due to
intellectual property issues associated with research tools.134 Scientists are able to
continue their research by “licensing, inventing around patents, going offshore, the
development and use of public databases and research tools, court challenges, and
simply using the technology without a license (i.e., infringement).” According to the
authors of the report, private sector owners of patents permitted such infringement
in academia (with the exception of those associated with diagnostic tests in clinical
trials) “partly because it can increase the value of the patented technology.”

Government Rights: Royalty Free Licenses and Reporting
Requirements
The government retains certain rights under the Bayh-Dole Act to protect the
public interest. The act states that the government is provided a “nonexclusive,
nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up license to practice or have practiced for or on
behalf of the United States any subject invention throughout the world....” This
license, commonly known as a “royalty free license,” has been the subject of some
discussion including whether or not this permits government purchasers to obtain
discounts on products developed from federally funded R&D, particularly
pharmaceuticals. A July 2003 GAO report addressed this issue and concluded that
the license entitles the government to practice or have practiced the invention on the
government’s behalf, but “does not give the federal government the far broader right
to purchase, ‘off the shelf’ and royalty free (i.e. at a discounted price), products that
happen to incorporate a federally funded invention when they are not produced under
the government’s license.”135 The study states that rights in one patent do not
“automatically” permit rights in subsequent, related patents.136 Because the
government apparently holds few licenses on the biomedical products it purchases
(generally through the Veteran’s Administration and the Department of Defense),137
federal officials indicated that procurement costs were best reduced by use of the
Federal Supply Schedule and national contracts.138 Government licenses are used
primarily in the performance of research in the biomedical area.139
A related issue is that of tracking the government’s interest in patents resulting
from federally funded research and development. Under the Bayh-Dole Act, grantees
are required to report annually on the utilization of any invention arising from
federally funded R&D. The Code of Federal Regulations (37 CFR 404.14(h)) states
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that these “reports shall include information regarding the status of development, date
of first commercial sale or use, gross royalties received by the contractor, and such
other data and information the agency may reasonably specify [emphasis added].”
In an August 1999 study, GAO noted that federal contractors and grantees were not
meeting the reporting requirements associated with the Bayh-Dole Act, making it
difficult to identify and assess what licenses the government retained, among other
things.140 Two years later, in a follow-up report, GAO stated that four of the five
agencies had taken steps to insure improved compliance with the law including
several new monitoring systems, although more needed to be done.141 To keep track
of inventions subject to the Bayh-Dole Act, in 1995 NIH created Interagency Edison
(iEdison), an Internet-based reporting system (that is also used by other federal
agencies). In response to the findings of GAO, suggestions by the NIH Interagency
Edison Working Group, and recommendations contained in the report A Plan to
Ensure Taxpayers’ Interests are Protected, new reporting requirements were
implemented effective January 1, 2002 that include “the commercial name of any
FDA-approved products, utilizing any subject invention, which have reached the
market during the annual reporting period.”142

Concluding Observations
To date, the U.S. system of research, development, and commercialization has
had a clear impact on the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. Policies
concerning funding for research, intellectual property protection, and cooperative
R&D have played an important part in the economic well-being of these sectors.143
American pharmaceutical firms have “consistently maintained a competitive edge in
international markets” and lead in new drug discoveries.144 The U.S. investment in
health-related R&D exceeds all other countries145 and has demonstrated a pattern of
R&D investment that has increased at approximately twice the rate of R&D growth
in Europe.”146
Incentives for innovation in the industrial community clearly have contributed
to substantial research and development by the pharmaceutical and biotechnology
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sectors. Pharmaceuticals companies (that are members of the Pharmaceutical
Researchers and Manufacturers Association/PhRMA) spent $39.4 billion on R&D
in 2005, $31.44 billion for research performed within the United States.147 PhRMA
estimates that total pharmaceutical R&D totaled $51.3 billion in 2005. The industry
employs approximately 223,000 individuals in highly skilled jobs.148 Prescription
drug sales by PhRMA members in the United States totaled $164.2 billion in 2005.149
American biotechnology companies generated $33.3 billion in product sales and $46
billion in revenue during 2004, as well as employed over 187,000 people.150 An
industry that did not exist 25 years ago, U.S. biotechnology has provided new
products and processes for the international marketplace, including approximately
330 biotech drugs and vaccines, with potential for many more advances.
Yet, some observers question whether or not there are unintended consequences
to current policies and programs related to innovation that may need to be addressed.
As discussed in this paper, the current legislative approach promotes the private
sector use of the results of federally funded research and development, particularly
through incentives to cooperative activities among government, industry, and
academia. This approach attempts to balance the public’s interest in new or
improved products and processes for the marketplace with concerns over providing
companies valuable benefits without adequate accountability or compensation.
Incentives for the commercialization of government-supported R&D have been
created in response to the argument that the economic benefits to the Nation’s
research investment occur when new goods and services are available to meet public
demand, create new jobs, improve productivity, and increase our standard of living.
To date, these results have been considered more important than the initial cost to the
government.
However, the particular nature of health-related R&D and the substantial federal
investment in this area have caused uncertainty over whether or not the present
balance is appropriate. Critics of the current approach argue that the need for
technology development incentives in the pharmaceutical and/or biotechnology
sectors is mitigated by industry access to government-supported R&D at no cost,
monopoly power through patent protection, and other regulatory and tax advantages.
They maintain that the benefits to industry are such that the public has the obligation
to expect a more direct financial return for the federal investment and, therefore, the
government should be permitted to provide input into certain drug pricing decisions.
Those who disagree point out that the collaborative public-private environment
created by federal policies and practices has generated extraordinary innovation in
the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. These sectors have provided
significant benefits to the health and well-being of the Nation. It remains to be seen
if changes will be made and if the nature of government-industry-university
cooperation will be altered.
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